Liberty Fund, , It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.
It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. The heart of this essay covers the case for the duration of judges in office. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more states than one; and though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Sir William Blackstone explains in his landmark treatise on the common law , Commentaries on the Laws of England:. Considerate men of every description ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts; as no man can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer today.
A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law.
It proves incontestably that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.
This exercise of judicial discretion in determining between two contradictory laws is exemplified in a familiar instance. In the present circumstances of this country and in those in which it is likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvantages on this score would be greater than they may at first whaf appear; but it must be confessed that they are far inferior to those which present themselves under the other aspects of the subject.
Federalist Paper #78 by Deondrae Carter on Prezi
Liberty Fund, It therefore tuesis to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.
Federalist Papers Summary The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what feedralist forbid. But this is mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law but from the nature and reason of the thing.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This arrangement does not render the judiciary the supreme branch of government. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. The observation, if it prove any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from fo body. As an aside, I find it curious that the Constitution does not explicitly give the courts the sole power to decide constitutionality of the laws even though the issue was discussed during the drafting of the Constitution.
The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated.
Federalist No. 78
Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of federqlist. The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law.
There is no authority to review judicial decisions from the supreme court and no means for the legislature, executive or the people to correct this situation when it occurs as it has today. Brutus paepr out that the Constitution did not provide an effective mechanism for controlling judicial caprice:.
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The judges must be independent to uphold the Constitution in the face of laws instigated by a major voice of the community. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright and impartial administration of the laws.
Paped other projects Wikisource. He says if this happens it only proves there should be no judges. That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission.
There are three subjects covered in this and thseis papers: So far as they can, by any fair construction, be reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that this should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect to one in exclusion of the other.
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that pa;er voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put federalits them is conclusive upon the other departments, wuat may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere yhe the latter and disregard the former.
In particular, it addresses concerns by the Anti-Federalists over the scope and power of the federal judiciary, which would have comprised unelected, politically insulated judges that would be appointed for life.